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WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE LONG-TERM CARE
REFORMS IN THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF
2005?
Ellen O'Brien*
Significant reform of long-term care financing in the United
States is long overdue. Unlike health care spending for acute
recuperative care, which is financed by Medicare, the burden of
providing and paying for long-term custodial care rests
disproportionately with individuals who need care and their
families.' For the elderly and disabled who need long-term care
services, the means-tested Medicaid program assists those who
meet its stringent eligibility criteria with the cost of care. 2
Unfortunately, Medicaid's benefits and eligibility vary widely
across the country; the program also often fails to provide care
to many in need and quality care to those it does serve, and it
inadequately protects the elderly from catastrophic financial
consequences resulting from the need for long-term care
services.3 Nevertheless, significant policy reform designed to
improve long-term care financing and to better distribute the

*Ellen O'Brien, Ph.D. is an economist with the Public Policy Institute at
AARP in Washington, D.C. Prior to August 2007, she was a Research
Associate Professor at Georgetown University. She earned her
Doctorate in Economics at the University of Notre Dame. The author
thanks Amy Watson and Alison Barnes for inviting her to participate
in the symposium and both the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and
the Uninsured and the Georgetown Long-Term Care Financing Project
for generous research funding.
1. See NAT'L ACAD. OF SOCIAL INS., DEVELOPING A BETIER LONG-TERM CARE
POLICY: A VISION AND STRATEGY FOR AMERICA'S FUTURE 3, 6 (Sheila P. Burke et al.
eds., 2005), available at http://www.nasi.org/usr-doc/Developing-aBetter-Long-Ter
m_CarePolicy.pdf.
2. Id. at 12.
3. Id. at 8, 13.
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risks of long-term care costs has failed to capture the attention of
policymakers.4 Recent policy reforms in Medicaid have only
made matters worse.
Congress reduced federal spending on a variety of domestic
social programs, including Medicaid, by enacting the Deficit
Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA).5 Many of the DRA's Medicaid
reforms serve to limit spending on health care for low-income
children and adults.6 The DRA also seeks to squeeze savings
out of Medicaid long-term care by restricting eligibility for
people needing assistance to pay the costs of nursing home care,
home care, or other community-based services.7
The chief promoters of the DRA reforms contended that the
federal, state, and local governments that finance Medicaid
could not afford to sustain the program at its prior level, and
that as the population ages, spending on the elderly would be
the largest threat to Medicaid budgets.8 Although people who
use long-term care services represent 7% of Medicaid
beneficiaries, a small minority, they are among the costliest
enrollees.9 Expenditures on these long-term care beneficiaries
account for just over half of Medicaid program spending."o
The reforms' promoters claimed that Medicaid had been
stretched beyond its original purpose of providing a safety net
for the poor."
The critics of Medicaid believed that the
program's financial eligibility rules created substantial
4. Id. at vi.
5. See Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (Westlaw current through Sept. 26,
2007). See also Gene V. Coffey et al., Analysis of Changes to Federal Medicaid Laws
Under the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, 2 NAELA J. 189, 193 (2006).
6. See id.
7. Id.
8. See NAT'L ACAD. OF SOCIAL INS., supra note 1, at vi.
9. ANNA SOMMERS ET AL., KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID AND THE
UNINSURED, MEDICAID'S LONG-TERM CARE BENEFICIARIES: AN ANALYSIS OF

SPENDING PATTERNS 1 (2006), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/7576.cfm (follow "Issue
Brief" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 9, 2007).
10. Id.
11. Stephen A. Moses, The Fallacy of Impoverishment, 30 THE GERONTOLOGIST 21
(1990); Editorial, Medicaid for Millionaires, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2005 at A14
[hereinafter Medicaidfor Millionaires].
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opportunities for people who were not poor, or who had not
been impoverished by health care or long-term care spending, to
avail themselves of Medicaid's subsidies.12 The reforms were
designed to prevent the elderly middle class, and potentially
even millionaires, from artificially impoverishing themselves in
order to qualify for the Medicaid subsidy and avoid spending
their own resources.' 3
According to this logic, many of the elderly who need longterm care artificially impoverish themselves by establishing
trusts, giving cash gifts to children and grandchildren, and
otherwise concealing their ability to pay for their care by
converting countable assets to exempt forms, such as home
renovations or cars, which are assets that are not considered
eligibility.14
Artificial
determining
Medicaid
when
impoverishment is said to occur frequently, and at significant
cost to the Medicaid program, as evidenced by the fact that
Medicaid covers the costs of nearly two-thirds of nursing home
residents.'" As a result, people who are not "genuinely needy"
draw finite resources away from needy children and families by
transferring to their heirs assets that could have paid for needed
care.16 In the long term, the middle-class "sense of entitlement"
to Medicaid's nursing home benefits creates a significant barrier
to the expansion of private long-term care insurance and other
options that would allow for increased personal responsibility
for long-term care.' 7
The DRA seeks to curtail these perceived abuses. Congress
12. Medicaidfor Millionaires,supra note 11, at A14.
13. Id.
14. See JAMES R. CANTWELL, NAT'L CTR. FOR POLICY ANALYSIS, NCPA POLICY
REPORT No. 197, REFORMING MEDICAID (1995), available at http://www.ncpa.org

/pub/st/st197/st197.pdf; Moses, supra note 11, at 21, 24.
15. StateHealthFacts.org, Distribution of Certified Nursing Facility Residents

by Primary Payer Source, 2005, http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparecat.jsp?
cat=4 (under the heading "Providers and Service Use - Nursing Homes, select
"Residents by Primary Payer Source" link) (last visited Oct. 9, 2007).
16. See generally id.
17. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FINANCING LONG-TERM CARE FOR THE ELDERLY
xi (2004), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/54xx/doc5400/04-26-LongTermCa

re.pdf.
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sought to make it more difficult for people to protect their
savings when they face a need for costly nursing home care or
home and community-based care.18 The DRA aims to encourage
older workers and retirees to prepare for future long-term care
needs on the premise that they have become immune to the
financial risk of catastrophic long-term care costs because of the
generous protection the Medicaid safety net provides.1 9 This
article makes the case that cutting Medicaid is unlikely to
substantially increase private sources of long-term care
financing, and future financing reform needs to focus on the
actual flaws in the current means-tested system of long-term
care financing.
In order to make this argument, this article briefly describes
the goals of the DRA and the policy reforms that seek to limit
eligibility for the middle-class elderly. Next, the article draws on
a wide range of empirical studies conducted over the past two
decades to demonstrate that the impact of Medicaid planning is
not quantitatively significant, and that by and large, the elderly
assume substantial personal responsibility for long-term care. A
discussion concerning weaknesses in the current long-term care
financing system and available alternatives to DRA-style reform
follows. Finally, this article identifies a set of goals that should
guide future long-term care financing reform, including
reducing
the burdens
of financing
care
that fall
disproportionately on people who need long-term care, as well
as reducing existing disparities in access and quality that
characterize Medicaid coverage today.
WHAT DOES THE DRA Do?

Medicaid eligibility for long-term care is very restrictive. 20
18. See generally Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4.
19. See NAT'L ACAD. OF SOCIAL INS., supra note 1, at 12-15.
20. See WLLIAM F. BASSETT, BD. OF GOVERNORS, FED. RESERVE SYS., MEDICAID
NURSING HOME COVERAGE AND ASSET TRANSFERS (2004), available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2004/200415/200415pap.pdf.
See also HOWARD
GLECKMAN, CTR. FOR RET. RESEARCH AT BOSTON COLL., MEDICAID AND LONG-TERM
CARE: How WILL RISING COSTS AFFECT SERVICES FOR AN AGING POPULATION 1, 3
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Eligibility requires individuals to have modest income, to
contribute most of their income toward the cost of care, and to
reduce their savings to very low amounts. 21 Individuals must
reduce their countable assets to $2000 or below, and they must
contribute all of their monthly income toward the cost of their
care, with the exception of an allowance for personal needs. 22
Special rules allow married couples to set aside income and
assets for a community spouse within federal guidelines, but
some states allow community spouses to keep only the federal
minimum level of income of $1650 per month and assets of
$19,908.00,23 which seems hardly enough to assure financial
security in retirement.
To avoid total impoverishment, elderly and their families
transfer or hide assets. 2 4 Medicaid is designed to impose a
penalty in the form of a temporary denial of eligibility on
applicants who shelter or divest assets for the purpose of
qualifying for assistance. 25 Critics say individuals can avoid
penalties by transferring assets in advance of applying for
Medicaid. 26 For example, prior to the DRA, the look-back period
for cash transfers was three years. Therefore, prospective
applicants could arrange to transfer their assets at least three

(2007), availableat http://www.bc.edu/centers/crr/issues/ib_2007-4.pdf.
21. See id.

22. Only certain assets are counted in determining Medicaid eligibility.
Countable assets include funds held in checking and savings accounts, stocks,
bonds, retirement funds from which withdrawals may be made, and real estate.
Exempt assets include a home, a car, and funds designated for burial expenses.
Under federal law, states have wide latitude in setting rules for how assets will be
counted for the purposes of Medicaid eligibility determinations. See Alison Barnes,
An Assessment of Medicaid Planning,3 HOUS. J.HEALTH L. & POL'Y 265, 272 (2003).
23. In 2007, the income protections for a community spouse range from a
minimum of $1650 per month to a maximum of $2541 per month. A community
spouse can keep at least half of the couple's joint assets, subject to minimum and
maximum thresholds: at least $19,908, and no more than $99,540. A community
spouse can also seek an increase in the community spouse resource allowance. See
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERV., SPOUSAL IMPOVERISHMENT STANDARDS,

http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicaidEligibility/downloads/1998-2007SSIFBR102406.p
df (last visited October 9, 2007).
24. See GLECKMAN, supra note 20, at 4.
25. See id.

26. See Coffey et al., supra note 5, at 194-196.
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years in advance of needing nursing home care. 27 The penalty
period began to run in the month that the person made the
transfer, and forward-looking individuals who were willing to
relinquish control of their assets could avoid an ineligibility
period. 28 Though critics argue that transfers occur with enough
frequency to affect Medicaid spending, transfers require an
appropriate amount of foresight, and a substantial amount of
trust that those holding the assets will, in fact, hold them for
future needs. 29
Another option for protecting resources is the "half-a-loaf"
Medicaid planning strategy, which is implemented closer to the
time when long-term care services are needed. 0 Under this
strategy, a person who needs long-term care can protect half of
his or her accumulated savings by transferring them to children
or grandchildren when first applying for assistance.31 The
applicant would be subject to a Medicaid penalty period, but
would be eligible for Medicaid once the period ends.3 2 This
approach may require the applicant to dispose of assets that he
or she may prefer to hold. If the strategy is used, the penalty
period is calculated by dividing the amount of assets transferred
by the average private cost of nursing home care.3 3 For example,
if an applicant transferred $5000 and the average daily cost of
care in the state is $125, the imposed penalty period is forty
days. During the penalty period, applicants can pay privately
for care in a nursing home or in an alternate setting, or forego
paid care.34
The DRA seeks to restrict Medicaid eligibility by
eliminating these and other "loopholes." The DRA changes
extend the look-back period for asset transfers from three to five
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

See id.
See id.
See BASSETr, supra note 20, at 3-4.
See Barnes, supra note 22, at 286.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See generally id.
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years, and most significantly, the start date of the penalty period
for asset transfers is not the first day of the month in which the
assets were transferred, but the date on which the applicant is
eligible for assistance under the state plan.3 5 The penalty period
is now triggered when an individual would be eligible for
medical assistance, but for the transfer. 36 This means that elders
who may have avoided a penalty period in the pre-DRA era will
now be penalized for transfers made years prior to needing
assistance, unless they can document that the transfer was made
for purposes other than to achieve Medicaid eligibility.37
The DRA makes a number of other changes to the long-term
care eligibility rules. It imposes a $500,000 cap on home equity,
which states may raise up to $750,000.31 Prior to the DRA, a
primary residence was exempt for Medicaid eligibility
determination regardless of its value.39 After the DRA, states
must deny eligibility for long-term care assistance if the
applicant has home equity in excess of $500,000; however, there
are exceptions, as no cap applies if a spouse is living in the
home. 40
The DRA also requires elders to disclose annuities, to name
the state as remainder beneficiary on the premise that elders can
utilize certain annuities to shelter assets, and to use the "incomefirst" rule when determining the monthly income maintenance
needs allowance for the community spouse, eliminating a
"resources-first" option that allowed some community spouses
to keep significant resources. 41 The DRA also allows all states to
create Long-Term Care Partnerships designed to expand sales of
private long-term care insurance by raising the Medicaid asset
limit for elders who buy qualified Partnership policies. 42

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Coffey et al., supra note 5, at 194-95, 197.
Id. at 197-98.
Id. at 195-96.
Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 6014.
Coffey et al., supra note 5, at 223.
Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 6014
Coffey et al., supra note 5, at 208-09, 217.
Id. at 243.
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As a result, individuals who need assistance with long-term
care will be required to provide more documentation of their
finances. 43 Moreover, elders who make cash gifts to children or
grandchildren or donations to charitable organizations in the
five years prior to applying for Medicaid will have to
demonstrate that they did not intend to remove those resources
from Medicaid's reach."
To assure that the new rules do not deny Medicaid
eligibility and needed services to people who are genuinely
unable to pay, the DRA requires states to have a process for
granting waivers of the penalty periods. 45 States must establish
processes whereby the penalty period can be waived for people
who would suffer "undue hardship," which is defined as a
situation where the applicable penalty would "deprive the
individual of medical care such that the individual's health or
life would be endangered; or food, clothing, or other necessities
of life." 46
Supporters of the reforms contend that these
protections will prevent actual hardship from befalling on elders
who made gifts without intending to game the Medicaid
eligibility rules. 47
How LEGITIMATE ARE THE CONCERNS ABOUT MEDICAID'S
ELIGIBILITY "LOOPHOLES?"

Do rampant abuses of Medicaid warrant the restrictive policies
required by the DRA? Does an overly generous Medicaid safety
net undermine the motivation of the elderly middle class to
prepare for retirement? Such a characterization fits in well with
our nation's obsession with personal responsibility, but most
claims about Medicaid's incentive effects are supported only by
43. Id. at 195-96.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 204-05.
46. Id. at 205.
47. Statement of Stephen A. Moses, President, Ctr. for Long-Term Care Reform,
The Future of Long-Term Care and Medicaid: Small Business Roundtable: Hearing on
Deficit Reduction Act Before Members of the H. Small Business Comm., 109th Cong. 1, 13,
39-43, 62-63, 97 (2006) [hereinafter The Future of Long-Term Care and Medicaid].
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anecdotal accounts of abuse. There is little factual evidence
showing that many elderly are actually planning their estates in
order to easily access Medicaid in the event that they need
nursing home care. 48 The most careful empirical research on
these questions demonstrates that disabled elderly lack the
financial resources to pay for care, but that the elderly and their
families likely will privately pay for care more than required
under Medicaid's eligibility rules. 49 Medicaid's critics also
frequently overstate the extent and magnitude of asset transfers,
and Medicaid appears to have very little impact on decisions to
purchase private long-term care insurance or to save for future
needs.50
MEDICAID LONG-TERM CARE PREDOMINANTLY BENEFITS THE
POOR AND Low-INCOME ELDERLY

Very few disabled elderly people living in the community
have sizable assets, particularly those at risk of nursing home
placement.51 The elderly reduce their savings to very modest
levels once they have substantial needs for assistance. 52
Although it is true that elderly households are less likely than
younger households to live in poverty, the median household
income of elderly Medicare beneficiaries is just over $27,000.53
Elderly women living alone have a median household income
below $12,000.5
The typical elderly household is far from wealthy, and
48. Stephen A. Moses, The Long-Term Care PartnershipProgram:Why It Failed and
How to Fix It, in WHO WILL PAY FOR LONG-TERM CARE? INSIGHTS FROM THE
PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMS 207, 211 (Nelda McCall ed., Health Admin. Press, 2001).
49. Id. at 208.
50. Id. at 211-12.
51. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MEDICAID LONG-TERM CARE: FEW
TRANSFERRED ASSETS BEFORE APPLYING FOR NURSING HOME COVERAGE; IMPACT OF
DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT ON ELIGIBILITY IS UNCERTAIN 1, 6 (Mar. 2007), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07280.pdf.
52. Moses, supra note 47, at 213.
53. ROBERT L. CLARK & JOSEPH F. QUINN, NAT'L ACAD. OF SOCIAL INS., THE
ECONOMIC STATUS OF THE ELDERLY 1, 2 (May 1999), available at http://www.nasi.org
/usrdoc/medicarebrief_4.pdf.
54. Id. at 1.
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much of the net worth of the elderly is housing wealth.55 In
1997, the median total wealth, or the financial wealth including
home equity, of elderly households was just about $110,000 for
individuals seventy years old and older. 56 Excluding home
equity, the median net worth of elderly households was just
$9,000.57
Clearly, financial wealth is unevenly distributed
among the elderly.58 Assets are almost nonexistent for the
elderly in the bottom 30% of the wealth distribution, while the
top 5%have financial wealth, excluding home equity, in excess
of $300,000.59
The elderly who are in poor health, frail, cognitively
impaired, or physically disabled have even more limited
financial resources.60 The elderly who reported that they were
in excellent health had more than three times the wealth than
those in poor health; when households in which both spouses
are both in excellent health are compared to households in
which both spouses are in poor health, the wealth disparity is
ten to one. 61
Most of the disabled elderly living in the community have
accumulated few assets beyond a home, and as a consequence,
they are financially eligible for Medicaid at admission to the
nursing home or within six months of admission.6 2 Few elderly
individuals have the ability to finance their own long-term care
needs when their needs extend over many years." As a result,
many qualify for Medicaid, and most would qualify for
Medicaid at admission to a nursing home.64 Most disabled

55. Id. at 4.
56. Id. at 6.
57. Id.
58. See id.
59. Id.
60. See id. at 7.
61. Id.
62. Frank A. Sloan & May W. Shayne, Long-Term Care, Medicaid, and
Impoverishment of the Elderly, 71 MILBANK Q. 575, 593-94 (1993).
63. See Coffey et al., supra note 5, at 197.
64. See Brenda C. Spillman & Peter Kemper, Lifetime Patterns of Payment for
Nursing Home Care, 33 MED. CARE 280, 293 (1995).
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elderly in the community have too little to warrant hiring an
attorney to arrange an asset transfer. 65
A large proportion of the elderly pay their own way
throughout their nursing home stays even though they have
limited resources; given their resources, the elderly are less
likely to rely on Medicaid than would be predicted. 66 Most
elderly nursing home residents rely on their limited private
resources, in full or in part, to pay the costs of nursing home
care. 67 Over their lifetimes, nearly 60% of the elderly who
receive nursing home care pay out of pocket, or they have brief
nursing home stays covered by Medicare. 68 The rest either
began their nursing home use and spent down to Medicaid
(14%) or have Medicaid coverage at admission to the nursing
home and throughout their stay (27%).69 Contrary to the critics'
portrayal, a substantial portion of the elderly pay for their own
nursing home care in full.70
AMONG MEDICAID NURSING HOME RESIDENTS, ASSET TRANSFERS
ARE RELATIVELY INFREQUENT AND SMALL IN MAGNITUDE

Medicaid-induced transfers are not widespread among
current or prospective nursing home residents.7 1 The majority of
the disabled elderly in the community, nearly 80%, are either
already financially eligible for Medicaid, or would become
eligible for Medicaid immediately upon entering a nursing
home. 72
It appears that the lack of significant wealth
accumulation beyond home equity accounts for the high
likelihood of qualifying for Medicaid, not asset transfers.
Nursing home residents divest much less than expected

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Sloan & Shayne, supra note 62, at 587.
See Spillman & Kemper, supra note 65, at 293.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILTY OFFICE, supra note 51, at 6.
See Spillman & Kemper, supra note 65, at 293.
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given their income and assets." Rather than transferring assets
to become Medicaid eligible, some extend the period of
ineligibility by receiving transfers from children or others, or by
voluntarily converting housing equity into liquid assets.7 4 A
"strong aversion to welfare" may account for the unexpectedly
low rate of Medicaid dependence, contradicting the
conventional belief that Medicaid's nursing home subsidy
creates a strong financial incentive to divest assets.75
Critics contend that the middle class elderly give large gifts
or establish trusts to preserve their assets for heirs. 76 Assets
placed in certain kinds of trusts are not treated as financial
resources available to pay for care, provided that they meet
certain criteria." The trust must be irrevocable, meaning the
trust's terms cannot be changed at any time;7 the trust also must
be established well in advance of applying for Medicaid, as
federal law imposes a sixty-month look back period for assets
placed in trust, 79 and the trustor may not have access to the
principal, though he or she may receive income from the trust.80
However, recent analysis of empirical data reveals that a
relatively small proportion of the elderly establish trusts to
establish Medicaid eligibility.81 Approximately four out of ten
elderly individuals could potentially alter their Medicaid
eligibility status by establishing a trust, but fewer than one in
ten, 7.8%, had a trust. 82 The wealthy use trusts primarily to
reduce tax burdens and avoid probate.8 3 Trusts were less
commonly established by those who believed they may need
73. See Donald H. Taylor et al., Formationof Trusts and Spend Down to Medicaid,
54B J.GERONTOLOGY: SOC. SCL S194 (1999).
74. Edward C. Norton, Elderly Assets, Medicaid Policy, and Spend-Down in
Nursing Homes, 41 REV. INCOME & WEALTH 309, 310 (1995).
75. Id. at 327.
76. Medicaidfor Millionaires,supra note 11, at A14.
77. Taylor et al., supra note 73, at S194.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at S197.
83. Id.
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nursing home care one day.M Those most likely to benefit from
the use of trusts in fact had none.85 Therefore "limited rationale
[exists] for further public policy efforts designed to limit the use
of trusts to achieve spend down" as such behavior is rare.86
The use of gifts to achieve Medicaid eligibility is also quite
limited.87 Analysis of accumulated asset transfers made by the
elderly indicates that about only one in one-hundred gave gifts
to children that would be large enough to qualify the elderly
person for Medicaid nursing home coverage.88 A recent analysis
of asset transfers appears to confirm these findings. Twentynine percent of the middle-class elderly gave gifts to children or
grandchildren of $500 or more, and most of those gifts were
relatively small; the typical gift, conditional on having given a
gift of at least $500, was $2,000, and the average gift was
$5,000.89 Individuals who have self-assessed a low probability of
entering a nursing home within the next five years made the
larger transfers.9 0
Though not specifically focused on Medicaid, another study
found compelling evidence that wealthy individuals transfer
assets to avoid estate taxation, but no evidence indicated that
people with more modest resources increase their gift-giving to
qualify for Medicaid." The study found that asset transfers are
more commonly made by those with assets exceeding the estate
tax filing threshold than by those with assets below the
threshold. 92 The more wealthy elderly are more likely to give
gifts than elderly with modest assets, and elderly are
substantially more likely to give gifts if they are in poor or

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id. at S200.
Id.
Id.
See id.
BASSETT, supra note 20, at 10.
Id.
Jonathan S. Feinstein & Chih-Chin Ho, Elderly Asset Management and Health,

in RETHINKING ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 457, 462 (William G. Gale et al. eds.,
Brookings Institution Press 2001).
92. Id. at 490.
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declining health. 93 Being in poor health apparently spurs the
wealthy elderly to increase gift-giving to avoid estate taxation.94
By contrast, elderly with relatively little wealth and with
declining health hold onto their assets.95 On average, they do
not give them away to qualify for Medicaid. 96 Elderly who have
relatively modest assets and who are in poor health may be
unwilling to part with assets because of concerns about future
medical costs, and they have strong precautionary motives to
safeguard their assets. 97 Thus, although the estate tax appears to
alter the asset allocation decisions of some relatively wealthy
individuals, there is little evidence that Medicaid distorts the
decisions of the elderly with modest resources. 98
In a report issued a year after Congress passed the DRA, the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded that
Medicaid nursing home residents have fewer savings and more
limited income than non-Medicaid-covered residents, and that
Medicaid residents are less likely to have transferred assets than
their non-Medicaid-covered counterparts.99 The GAO reviewed
actual applications for Medicaid long-term care assistance in
three states, and it confirmed that the substantial majority of
applicants, 85 to 90%, had non-housing resources below $30,000
and annual incomes below $20,000. 100
Only a small fraction of Medicaid applicants, and an even
smaller share of those eligible for Medicaid, transferred assets
before they qualified for Medicaid.10 In the 1993 report, the
GAO reviewed more than 400 applications for Medicaid nursing
home assistance in Massachusetts, a state thought to have a high

93. Id. at 462.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See id.
97. Id.
98. See id. at 490.
99. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILrY OFFICE, supra note 51, at 6.
100. Id.
101. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MEDICAID ESTATE PLANNING 1, 2
(1993), availableat http://archive.gao.gov/d43tl4/149635.pdf.
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level of estate planning. 102 Only a small fraction of applicants
had transferred assets, and the average amount transferred was
$46,000.103 Further, about half of the applicants who had
transferred assets were subsequently denied eligibility for
Medicaid. 0 A significantly larger share of Medicaid applicants,
50%, had converted countable assets to exempt forms.10
Typically, they used excess assets to prepay funeral expenses. 0 6
However, the amount of assets protected in this way was very
The study did not find that
small, $4,700 on average.107
Medicaid eligibility motivated the asset transfers. 108
MEDICAID IS NOT A BARRIER TO SAVING

Medicaid's means-tested nursing home benefits do not
appear to interfere with future planning. Critics suggest that
Medicaid eligibility rules create strong disincentive to assume
personal responsibility for future long-term care needs.10
Critics argue that because the middle-class elderly are aware
that they can easily qualify for Medicaid while protecting their
assets, they fail to plan for long-term care needs by saving or by
purchasing private long-term care insurance.110 Critics also
suggest that for lower income households, the availability of
Medicaid, in conjunction with the sizeable costs of medical care,
may make the option of Medicaid reliance preferable to
The empirical data,
engaging in precautionary savings."'
although limited, apparently does not support the claim that
Medicaid deters savings or creates a significant barrier to the
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2, 9.
Id.

108. See generally id.
109. The Future of Long-Term Care and Medicaid, supra note 47, at 58-59.
110. Id.
111. See GORDON MCDONALD ET AL., RET. SEC. PROJECT, THE EFFECT OF ASSET
TESTS ON SAVING 2-6 (2006), available at http://www.cbpp.org/6-21-05socsec-meth.
pdf.
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purchase of private long-term care insurance.
There is some evidence that means-tested programs reduce
savings rates for certain low-income groups.112 However,
available studies do not suggest that the elderly at risk of
entering a nursing home are spending down or dis-saving at
faster rates than the rest of the elderly, or that they are failing to
accumulate assets because of an anticipated Medicaid-financed
nursing home stay. 13
The prospect of receiving a Medicaid subsidy for nursing
home care may impact the elderly's saving practices, but it does
not reduce the accumulation of savings as measured by nonhousing assets. 114 The wealth holdings of the elderly decline
over time, but asset divestitures, or spending out of assets,
seemingly have little relationship to the likelihood of gaining
Medicaid eligibility. In fact, the elderly who reduce their net
wealth holdings the most are the wealthiest, who are unlikely to
In contrast, elderly more likely to
qualify for Medicaid.'
qualify for Medicaid reduce their savings at a much slower

112. See JEFFREY BROWN & AMY FINKELSTEIN, NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON.
RESEARCH, THE INTERACTION OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INSURANCE: MEDICAID AND
THE LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE IARKET (2004) available at http://www.nber.org

/papers/10989. Brown and Finkelstein's simulation model demonstrates that
Medicaid's nursing home subsidy is "sufficient" to explain the low rate of purchase
of private long-term care insurance among the elderly. Id. at 16. In their analysis,
even highly risk adverse consumers are unlikely to purchase insurance coverage for
long-term care services, which they could otherwise obtain for "free" from
Medicaid. Id. at 21; MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 111, pincite??. With regard to
savings decisions, economists suggest that "programs with asset-based means
testing can discourage saving by households with low expected lifetime income."
Id. at 3. Although Orszag identifies a few studies which demonstrate that welfare
programs like Medicaid and Supplemental Security Income may create barriers to
savings for low-income families, there are few studies that examine the impact of
Medicaid's nursing home subsidy on the savings behavior of older workers and the
retired elderly. Id. at 2, 4, 6.
113. See MCDONALD ET AL., supra note 111, at 2, 4, 6.
114. Frank A. Sloan et al., Effects of Strategic Behavior and Public Subsidies on
Families' Savings and Long-Term Care Decisions, in LONG-TERM CARE: ECONOMIC
ISSUES AND POLICY SOLUTIONS 45, 65 (Eisen et al. eds., Kluwer Academic Publishers
1996).
115. See generally Feinstein & Ho, supra note 91 (explaining that wealthy people
transfer more than poor people and that poor people in poor health transfer even
less than poor people in good health).
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rate." 6 Furthermore, elderly who enter nursing homes do spend
down assets, contrary to critics' arguments that the elderly do
not spend through savings because Medicaid's lax rules make it
easy to avoid impoverishment.1 17 On average, a nursing home
stay reduces wealth by an estimated $20,000.118
Using data from a national survey of the elderly, there was
no evidence that elderly who expect to use long-term care
services reduce their assets in order to qualify for Medicaid.11 9
In fact, regardless of wealth, married couples expecting to need
long-term care services save more than those who do not expect
the need.120 Among married couples, a belief that the wife is
likely to enter a nursing home leads to an increase in savings
and a reduction in consumption. 121 This occurs regardless of the
initial level of the household's financial assets. 122 There is no
evidence showing that couples with limited financial assets
expecting to enter long-term care consume more assets than
couples with significant assets in an effort to achieve Medicaid
eligibility. 123 Unmarried or widowed women who expect to
enter nursing homes do not increase their savings rate; however,
they generally have accumulated more savings than individuals
not expecting to need nursing home care, suggesting that they
plan to rely on savings to pay for care.124 There is a strong
precautionary motive for savings.125 The data seems to indicate
that elderly who have enough income and expect to need long-

116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
See Spillman & Kemper, supra note 64, at 293.
Id.
ANTHONY WEBB, INT'L LONGEVITY CTR., THE IMPACT OF THE COST OF LONG-

TERM CARE ON THE SAVING OF THE ELDERLY 1 (discussing the 1993 and 1995 waves
of the Asset and Health Dynamics of the Oldest Old (AHEAD) survey used to
analyze how Medicaid eligibility, marital status, and an person's expectations or
beliefs about their likely future use of long-term care services affects how much
they save and spend).
120. Id. at 2.

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 22.
Id.
See id. at 2.
Id. at 21.
See id. at 22 (noting that there is an unwillingness to rely upon Medicaid).
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term care continue to accumulate assets, not divest them.
MEDICAID IS NOT A SIGNIFICANT BARRIER TO THE PURCHASE OF
PRIVATE LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE

Medicaid is not a major barrier to the purchase of private
long-term care insurance. 126 When decisions to purchase private
long-term care insurance by both elderly and non-elderly
individuals are assessed, the availability and generosity of
Medicaid benefits has no effect on the demand for the insurance
among workers age fifty-one to sixty-four.127 There is very weak
empirical evidence that Medicaid affected purchases by the
elderly seventy years old and older.128
However, the elderly appear somewhat more likely to buy
private long-term care insurance in states that have more
restrictive Medicaid coverage. Elderly individuals were also
more. likely to purchase private insurance (1) the lower the
Medicaid payment for nursing home care; (2) the lower the
likelihood of qualifying for Medicaid; (3) the lower the home
maintenance allowance or the amount of monthly income
nursing home residents can set aside for the upkeep of their
home while they are in the nursing home; and (4) if Medicaid
recovered the value of a home of single nursing home
residents.129
Although present, the quantitative impact of
Medicaid eligibility on the purchase of private insurance
appears far too small to explain why so few elderly people
obtain private long-term care insurance coverage.
Since Medicaid's effects on the purchase of private long-

126. Frank A. Sloan & Edward C. Norton, Adverse Selection, Bequests, Crowding
Out, and Private Demand for Insurance: Evidence from the Long-Term Care Insurance
Market, 15 J. OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 201, 216 (1997).
127. Id. at 204, 216.

128. Id.
129. The crowd-out hypothesis suggests that people should be more willing to
buy private long-term care insurance when Medicaid beds are in short supply, but
the empirical data fail to support this hypothesis. The model indicates that
purchases of private long-term care insurance were, in fact, lower in states with a
more limited supply of Medicaid nursing home beds. See id. at 205-06, 211-14.
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term care insurance are small, other factors must account for the
low demand for the insurance.o3 0 Many potential purchasers
who can afford long-term care insurance policies and pass
underwriting screens may reject the policies because they
question the value of policies, which often provide thin coverage
and rigorous exclusions. Restricting Medicaid's role for people
with modest means who cannot afford private long-term care
insurance thus seems unlikely to expand the private insurance
market.
SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY "LOOPHOLES"

To summarize, an abundance of empirical data suggests
that elderly who are frail, cognitively impaired, and physically
disabled that rely on Medicaid are either poor or have only
modest incomes and very limited financial resources. 3'
Medicaid gaming is, therefore, a quantitatively insignificant
driver of Medicaid costs. Even if a small proportion of Medicaid
nursing home residents have modest resources that could be
used to pay for several weeks or months of care, finding those
additional private resources likely represents a drop in the
bucket in long-term care spending.
There is no evidence that the elderly use transfers or trusts
to significantly shift cost burdens to Medicaid, and little
evidence indicates that those who do transfer sizable assets gain
Medicaid eligibility.132 Furthermore, there is little evidence that
Medicaid interferes with savings for future needs, or that it
prevents people from purchasing private long-term care
insurance.133 The elderly who expect to need nursing home care,
and especially those with modest financial means and are likely
to qualify for Medicaid, actually save more, and not less, than

130. See generally id. (providing tables that show that a limited supply of
Medicaid did not affect purchase of insurance).
131. See Sloan & Shayne, supra note 62, at 596.
132. See Sloan et al., supra note 114, at 65.
133. See WEBB, supra note 119, at 21-22. See also Sloan & Norton, supra note 126,
at 215-16.
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those who do not expect to use nursing home care.'3 Finally,
generous Medicaid eligibility explains very little about why
there exists very low demand for private long-term care
insurance.135
Reforms designed to curb asset transfers will produce only
negligible Medicaid savings.136 These reforms are expected to
produce only modest reductions in federal Medicaid spending
on long-term care and corresponding reductions in state
spending.'17 The Congressional Budget Office projects these
eligibility restrictions to net federal savings of $2.4 billion over
five years between 2006 and 2010, or about 1 to 2% of the
projected federal Medicaid long-term care spending. 3 8
Estimates of the likely impact of policy proposals that
would further restrict asset transfers also suggest that asset
For example,
transfer is not a significant problem.
approximately 220,000 households transferred assets totaling $1
billion in 1993, largely because of the incentives provided by
Medicaid eligibility rules.' 39 The elimination of those transfers
might have reduced Medicaid nursing home spending by 3% in
1993.140 However, that is an upper bound estimate because an
unknown portion of that $1 billion in estimated Medicaidinduced transfers ends up as a cost to Medicaid.141 Not all of the
people estimated to make transfers will actually enter a nursing
home or spend any time on Medicaid.14 2

134. See WEBB, supra note 119, at 21-22.

135. See Sloan & Norton, supra note 126, at 216.
136. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE, S. 1932 -DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF

2005 37 (January 27, 2006), available at http://cbo.gov/ftpdocs/70xx/doc7028/sl932co
nf.pdf.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. BASSETr, supra note 20, at 18-19.
140. Id. at 19.
141. Id.

142. Id. at 4, 19.
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WHAT SHOULD BE THE GOALS OF LONG-TERM CARE
FINANCING REFORM?

Underlying the long-term care reforms in the DRA is a
perception that potentially significant Medicaid resources are
used to pay for the care of relatively well-off people who could
have paid for care on their own. This is clearly a problem, but as
the empirical research reviewed demonstrates, it is not a large
enough problem to justify the very restrictive DRA rules. The
DRA will likely not only make life harder for thousands of
people of very modest means, but it also fails to address the real
and most pressing challenges in long-term care financing. The
DRA provides no fiscal relief to states, nor does it appear to
assist individuals and families who bear most of the burden of
providing and paying for care. It prevents low-income and
middle class families with long-term care needs from protecting
even modest assets.
Meaningful long-term care reform needs to move in a
different direction.
Reforms should be implemented that
expand federal financing, reduce unmet needs for care, and
eliminate the disparities in access to care and quality that are
pervasive in Medicaid. These reforms are needed in order for
the Medicaid program to be adequately prepared to meet the
needs of an aging baby boom population. Reforms should also
alleviate fiscal burdens on states, ensure the effective use of
public sources of funding including Medicare, and increase
choices of services and settings for consumers.
CREATE A MORE EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF THE BURDENS OF
PROVIDING AND PAYING FOR CARE

Today, the burdens of providing care and paying for
services fall disproportionately on people who need care and
their families. 43 People who need care have modest resources.
Studies suggest that they pay for care longer than they should
143. See GLECKMAN, supra note 20, at 1.
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and receive care without assistance and support longer than
they should.144 As needs grow with the aging of the baby
boomer generation, the strains and weaknesses of the existing
system will become more apparent; the strains are placed, both
on individuals and families who must exhaust resources, and on
states, especially those expecting the largest increases in their
Future reforms of long-term care
elderly populations. 45
financing need to change the current mix of public and private
responsibility for long-term care. Reforms should enhance
protections for the modest estates of the elderly who need longterm care, just as Medicare does today for individuals who need
expensive health care services. Financing reforms should create
meaningful opportunities for individuals to use, but not exhaust,
their personal resources.
REDUCE UNMET NEED FOR LONG-TERM CARE SERVICES

An underappreciated fact about individuals who need longterm care in the United States is that many receive some care,
but not all of the care that they need."6 Although there are
relatively few studies regarding the gaps between needed care
and amount of received care, at least one study suggests that a
sizable minority of individuals, 20%, who need long-term care
but who are living in the community outside of institutions do
not receive the care they need and suffer as a result.147 The lack
of needed care increased the likelihood that the individuals
would experience serious consequences like falling, soiling
themselves, and being unable to eat, bathe, or dress.148 The
limitations on Medicaid's means-tested assistance may not
account for all unmet need, but the increased use of paid
144. See generally Harriet L. Komisar et al., Unmet Long-Term Care Needs: An
Analysis of Medicare-MedicaidDual Eligibles, 42 INQUIRY 171 (2005).
145. MARK MERLIS, GEORGETOWN UNIV. LONG-TERM CARE FIN. PROJECT,
MEDICAID AND AN AGING POPULATION 2 (July 2004), available at http://1tc.george

town.edu/pdfs/merlis.pdf.
146. Komisar et al., supra note 144, at 178.
147. NAT'L ACAD. OF SOCIAL INS., supra note 1, at 8.
148. Komisar et al., supra note 144, at 178.
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services reduces the amount of need in states with more
expansive services, suggesting that long-term care is
underfunded in many parts of the country.'4 9 Financing reform
needs to boost the public resources available to pay for care, not
reduce them.
REDUCE DISPARITIES IN ACCESS AND QUALITY THAT ARE
PERVASIVE IN MEDICAID TODAY

The amount that States spend on Medicaid long-term care
per elderly person varies widely by state.150 In fiscal year 2001,
estimated state spending, excluding federal matching funds,
ranged from $61 per elderly person in Louisiana to $1,323 per
person in New York.15 Although Americans may want longterm care financing reforms that require individuals to make
personal, yet affordable contributions, most would likely agree
that the frail elderly should have access to care of roughly
comparable quality regardless of where they live.
REDUCE FISCAL BURDENS ON STATES

State resources currently devoted to long-term care for the
elderly vary widely by state, and in the future, different rates of
population aging in states may shift the financial burdens
among states.152 States with the largest elderly populations will
face the greatest pressures, raising the question of whether the
current financing structure is sustainable. 5 3 Under the current
structure, some states will bear greater burdens than others.154 If
Medicaid policies remain unchanged, some of the states that
have been spending the least on long-term care will see the
greatest increase in demand."s
149. See id. at 179.
150. Merlis, supra note 145, at 1.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. NAT'L ACAD. OF SOCIAL INS., supra note 1, at 17.

154. See id.
155. Merlis, supra note 145, at 2.
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The Medicaid matching formula could be changed to
provide more assistance to states facing increasing demand and
cost growth. Given the political difficulties of reallocating
federal Medicaid funds across states, a better option may be to
alleviate much of the burden on states by shifting these costs to
the federal budget.
ASSURE THE EFFECTIVE USE OF PUBLIC RESOURCES, INCLUDING
MEDICARE

The DRA provides some additional opportunities for states
to use existing public resources more effectively.1 56 It provides
opportunities for states to expand and improve their efforts to
provide home and community-based options for low-income
people who need long-term care. 157 The DRA creates a new state
option whereby states can establish home and community based
services options without a burdensome waiver application
process. It also provides federal funds for a "Money Follows the
Person" demonstration program, and it extends a "cash and
counseling" model to let consumers, with the aid of case
managers, decide which services and service providers best
meet their needs. 58
States may be able to do some innovative things with the
new options made available in the DRA, but there is no
guarantee that they will do the right thing. Advocates have
raised concerns that states may use the new home and
community-based services option to reduce the entitlement to
long-term care services, not expand access to needed care. 159
Considerable attention should be paid to the way in which
any new public long-term care benefit interacts with Medicare.
The mantra that Medicare does not pay for long-term care is

156. See generally Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See generally Gene V. Coffey, Narrowing Medicaid's LTC Coverage? The
Implications of the DRA's Home and Community-Based Care Benefit, 9 ELDER'S ADVISOR
131 (2007).

2007]

WHAT'S WRONG WITH THE DRA REFORMS?

127

only partly true.160
In fact, Medicare expends significant
resources on nursing home and home health care that benefits
many people with long-term care needs.161 A necessary element
of any long-term care financing reform will be to assure that
multiple sources of funding, including personal resources,
Medicare, Medicaid, and other new public sources of funding,
are combined in cost-effective ways.
INCREASE LONG-TERM CARE CHOICES FOR CONSUMERS AND
CAREGIVERS

The Medicaid program limits choices for elderly people
who need long-term care. 16 2 Medicaid spends substantially
more on nursing home care than on home and communitybased care,163 and people who need home-based care often are
confronted with limited options and long waiting lists for
services.' 6 Any new financing system should allow for access to
an array of home and community-based services, as well as
alternative congregate living arrangements. Although it might
be reasonable to limit public subsidies to the catastrophic risk
associated with long-term institutional care, restricting coverage
to nursing home care will limit assistance to only the small
proportion of elderly with long-term care needs, most of whom
live in the community.
The following six elements of reform are based on a very
different assessment of what is wrong with long-term care
financing today and how it can and should be fundamentally
restructured to prepare for the aging of the baby boom
generation. Without reform, many families will continue to
stretch the resources they have, and for the most part, "make
do." However, many elderly individuals will continue to suffer
without adequate assistance, and family members will reach
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

See NAT'L ACAD. OF SOCIAL INS., supra note 1, at 6.
See id.
See id. at 13.
Id.
Id.
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their physical, emotional, and financial limits.
There are many reasons why long-term care reform will be
difficult to achieve. One is that family members, usually
women, bear the burdens of care.165 If women are strained in
their caregiver roles, there are costs incurred associated with
them reducing work hours or leaving the workforce, which
often seem to be disregarded by policymakers.
A second reason is that long-term care services are regarded
as having low value. The health policy community is fixated on
the need to assure the effectiveness of health care spending, but
policy analysts have never made a particularly strong case for
the value of long-term care services in reducing unmet need, as
well as for its effects of improving the quality of life of the frail
and disabled. Of course, long-term care services are provided to
the disabled and the frail because there is a moral value in caring
for the sick and the frail, and not only because those services
have demonstrable value in terms of improving functioning and
extending life.
Nevertheless, in the current environment,
without evidence of the impacts, the battle to secure additional
funding is likely to be an uphill one.
Financing reforms that have the best chance of achieving
these goals must expand public financing for long-term care.
There are different ways to shift the mix of public and personal
responsibility for long-term care. One option is to expand
financial eligibility for means-tested Medicaid benefits so that
the program provides adequate financial protection against
long-term care costs. For example, the resource limit for an
individual could be raised from the current $2,000 limit to
$30,000 and have subsequent annual increases in order to keep
pace with inflation, much like the spousal impoverishment
protections work today. Increased federal financing would be
required to expand Medicaid without imposing additional costs
on states.
A second and better option is to create a universal
165. LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & ALISON MCCHRYSTAL BARNES, ELDER LAW CASES

AND MATERIALS 19-20 (LexisNexis 4th ed. 2007).
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entitlement to long-term care benefits through Medicare or a
new federal program. Creating a social insurance program for
long-term care could have the advantage of stable federal
funding with enduring political support. There are a number of
barriers to expanded federal financing. For example, concerns
about the rapid growth in existing entitlements for the elderly
by way of Social Security and Medicare make it difficult to
imagine a significant expansion in the current political climate.
However, concerns about the federal budget should not prevent
a reasoned discussion concerning how to more equitably spread
the risks of long-term care that now devastate budgets of the
relatively small number of families affected by catastrophic
long-term care costs.
CONCLUSION

The DRA provides some modest relief to the federal, state, and
local governments that jointly finance Medicaid, and it promises
to target those resources more effectively. Although it is
possible to imagine a scenario where public subsidies are
reduced for upper middle-class individuals who are able to pay
for their own care in order to improve the amount and quality of
means-tested assistance for low-income individuals, the DRA is
unlikely to deliver it. It remains to be seen how states will
implement the DRA and how elderly applicants for Medicaid
assistance will be affected. However, it is likely that much of the
savings will accrue because those with very modest resources
will spend more on care.
The DRA made no effort to simplify or to expand eligibility
and create more uniform protections across states. Instead, it
requires states to implement changes to the eligibility rules that
will make the application and determination process
significantly more complex without generating the desired fiscal
relief for state and federal budgets.
Some may argue that advocates for better long-term care
services were somewhat successful due to the DRA reforms that
increased flexibility to expand home services, community-based
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services, and provided additional federal monies to pay for
those services. However the fundamental goal of the DRA is to
reduce public responsibility and increase private responsibility
for long-term care. That is a worrisome trend. Changing course
to reduce the already large burdens on those who need care will
require better appreciation of the gaps in the current system, the
impact of these gaps on individuals and families, and the
feasibility and affordability of meaningful alternatives to the
inadequate approach to financing that we have today.

